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1Mr Vice-Chancellor, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, 
Economics at Rhodes was pioneered by the historian 
W.M.Macmillan, who took up a lectureship in 1911 in the 
newly created dual Department of History and 
Economics. That the subject was initially taught in a 
Department of History and Economics was very fitting, as 
is the fact that it came to be, and still is, taught at 
Rhodes in a joint Department of Economics and 
Economic History. For, as Keynes pointed out, one of the 
things required of the economist is that he "study the 
present in the light of the past for the purposes of the 
future".
No one was to do more to establish economics as a 
major subject in various faculties at Rhodes, and to carry 
on Macmillan’s pioneering research in the area of poverty, 
than Desmond Hobart Houghton. He was in charge of 
economics here from 1932 to the end of 1966. In 1954 he 
had been a prime mover in the establishment of the 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, and on his 
retirement from the Chair he took up the Directorship. 
Several generations of students and staff, including myself, 
were greatly influenced by his inspiring teaching and his 
personal values. Many of us owe much to him, and to his 
wife Betty. They are both fondly remembered. I
I fear that the title of my lecture may have brought some 
of you here under false pretences. I shall not be engaging 
in crystal ball gazing into the future: rather, though my 
concern is with the future, my lecture will necessarily 
involve reflections on the past and present. I shall attempt
2to define the essential problems and some significant 
trends in manufacturing industry, and how these may be 
affected by the transition to a New South Africa.
Ernest Gellner1 states: "Mankind is irreversibly committed 
to industrial society, and therefore to a society whose 
productive system is based on cumulative science and 
technology". Without this commitment, he argues, there is 
no prospect of the rapidly growing number of inhabitants 
of this planet achieving the kind of standard of living 
which some now take for granted, and to which the rest 
aspire. The aspirations of the people of South Africa are 
no different, and, as in the case of mankind in general, 
the realization of their aspirations depends on 
commitment to industrial society.
Sustained, long-term increases in the standard of living 
will depend on economic growth, especially the expansion 
of manufacturing industry. Achieving this, however, will be 
no easy task.
To assess our future prospects, we need to begin with an 
appraisal of our present position. Certainly our economic 
performance to date has been poor. As the first figure 
shows, the rate of increase of income per head of South 
Africa’s population has declined greatly since the early 
1970’s, and become much more erratic. Our economic 
performance was particularly dismal in the 1980s. Between 
1980 and 1989, the standard of living declined in five 
years out of nine, and is projected to decline by a further 
2 per cent in 1990. It is lower now than at any time
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4since 1970. Unemployment is increasing to terrible 
proportions2.
The growth of manufacturing industry has followed a 
similarly unsatisfactory pattern. Why is this? It is 
sometimes suggested that our poor performance has been 
largely affected by forces beyond our control. It is true 
that a deterioration in economic conditions is not peculiar 
to this country. Since the late 1960s there has been a 
worldwide decline in growth rates. The South African 
economy has followed a worldwide trend.
However, this clearly does not mean that factors peculiar 
to South Africa, involving social, political and economic 
structures, did not have some influence on the behaviour 
of the economy. During this period of worldwide 
stagnation, some countries deteriorated more than others. 
In particular, some of the so-called Newly Industrialising 
Countries (such as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan), not to mention Japan, were able to maintain 
relatively healthy economies. In some cases they even 
managed for a time to accelerate their growth rates 
against the worldwide trend. The national characteristics 
of countries thus clearly had a significant influence on 
economic performance. The question is, "Why did South 
Africa not behave like one of the more successful Newly 
Industrialising Countries?"
The Newly Industrialising Countries achieved their high 
rates of growth through growth of manufacturing 
industries, in particular through rapid expansion of exports
5of manufactured goods. Export of manufactured goods is 
the key to sustained, rapid industrialisation and to rapid 
increases in standard of living.
Could we have improved our situation by adopting a 
policy formula - to increase exports of manufactured 
goods? The answer is not so straightforward. A country 
cannot choose willy-nilly to adopt a strategy of export- 
oriented industrialisation. The ability to pursue such a 
strategy is heavily circumscribed by social, political and 
economic structures.
A major obstacle to South Africa achieving rapid, export- 
oriented industrialisation has been the plain fact that we 
are a country well endowed with minerals of various 
kinds. South Africa in short is a minerals-rich country. 
This is a mixed blessing for manufacturers.
To export manufactured goods, a country needs to be 
internationally competitive. If a country is minerals-rich, 
one of the ways in which its international competitiveness 
is reduced is by the effect of mineral exports on the 
foreign exchange rate of its currency. For instance, if the 
price of our main export, gold, doubles or trebles 
suddenly, the value of the gold shipped abroad increases 
accordingly, and we achieve a dramatic increase in 
earnings of foreign currency. We have more foreign 
currency than we need to pay for our imports. The value 
of the Rand therefore strengthens against other
currencies.
6As everyone knows, when the Rand is strong, so that the 
price of a dollar or British pound at the bank is low, 
foreign travel is relatively inexpensive. Similarly a strong 
Rand makes foreign produced goods relatively cheap to 
us, and South African produced goods relatively more 
expensive both to us and to foreigners. An increase in 
the value of our mineral exports therefore is damaging to 
the ability of South African manufacturers to compete 
against foreign producers in domestic and export markets.
This problem has plagued South African manufacturing 
industry. The second figure shows fluctuations in what is 
called the real effective exchange rate. For our purposes, 
it is sufficient to think of a rise in the index as reflecting 
a strengthening of the Rand, and therefore a deterioration 
in the competitiveness of South African manufacturers. A 
fall indicates a weakening of the Rand, and therefore an 
improvement in competitiveness. The sharp increases in 
the index in 1973-74 and 1979-80 largely reflect the 
soaring of the gold price in those years. The weakness of 
the Rand from mid-1984 on reflects, inter alia, the 
combined effect of a forty per cent decline in gold output 
over the past two decades, and continual downward 
pressure on the gold price.
This chart carries two significant messages. The first is a 
message for manufacturers for the present and future. We 
need to export a much larger volume and broader range, 
of manufactured goods. So far as the exchange rate is 
concerned, our manufacturing has never before been so 
potentially competitive, for so long, as it has been since
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81984. In short, there is both a need and a somewhat 
greater ability to adopt an export-oriented industrialisation 
strategy. Since, as I said earlier, exporting is the key to 
rapid industrialisation, this may be seen as a new 
opportunity; but taking advantage of it will involve a 
painful process of structural adjustment. This has some 
nasty implications for government, business and unions. If 
the economy is to grow rapidly, however, it seems to me 
we have no option now but to join the global scramble 
for export markets.
The second message of the chart is that in earlier 
decades we had no option but to concentrate mainly on 
import substitution - that is production of previously 
imported manufactured goods, mainly for the home 
market. Such import substitution was often encouraged by 
means of customs tariffs or duties on imports. This was 
not an error, as some now think. Import substitution was 
a necessary phase in our economic development. A 
minerals-rich economy must be diversified to guard 
against future unforeseen declines in the output or price 
of minerals, even if this involves some costs3. My view, 
first stated many years ago4 , is that we erred oft the side 
of too little import substitution in some branches of 
manufacturing. In the 1980s we paid a heavy price for 
this.
The challenge facing us now, in very difficult 
circumstances, is export expansion. Currency depreciation 
is not enough for the competitiveness which this requires. 
Other positive trends have been developing. Some of
9these have affected the cost of labour. Other things being 
equal, cheaper labour has a favourable effect on 
competitiveness. There are three discernible trends 
affecting the cost of labour, which have since the 1960s 
tended to improve our international competitiveness - the 
erosion of the industrial colour bar, shifts in the 
geographical location of industry, and sub-contracting. Let 
us take each in turn.
First, the industrial colour bar - or the practice of 
reserving jobs for whites at the expense of other racial 
groups. This increased the cost of labour by giving 
preference to expensive white labour over other cheaper 
labour. A recent study5 shows a remarkable change in the 
occupational structure of Africans. Between 1965 and 1985 
there was what the authors call an "astonishing 
transformation" of the African manufacturing labour force 
from a largely unskilled to a predominantly semi-skilled 
workforce. In other words, blacks have been upwardly 
mobile. The significance of this for labour costs, it seems 
to me, is that although the average wage rate of blacks 
increases as black workers move up into higher-wage, 
more skilled jobs, the employer pays a black worker less 
than he would have to pay a white in the same job. 
Semi-skilled and skilled labour therefore costs him less, 
and he is able to produce cheaper, more competitive 
goods. As the study emphasizes, the racial divide remains: 
at the lowest job levels there are few whites and at the 
upper levels few blacks. Nevertheless, as a trend it is 
significant. What caused it?
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There are various possible explanations, but in my view 
the only one consistent with the evidence is that the 
interests of employers in cheaper labour began to be 
asserted against the interests of white workers. In the 
face of intensified international competition, South African 
industry was under pressure to use cheaper black labour 
instead of more expensive white. Contrary to some views, 
it was economic adversity, rather than rapid growth, which 
undermined this particular aspect of apartheid. This trend 
was then reinforced politically by the Wiehahn 
Commission report of 1980 which made unification of the 
labour market official policy. It has had both political 
and economic results. On the one hand, it has improved 
the competitiveness of South African manufacturing 
industry; on the other it has contributed to the emergence 
of right wing political parties, which are largely supported 
by the threatened white labour force. But the fact 
remains that upward mobility of the black labour force 
must continue if we are to become a successful and 
egalitarian industrial society. This illustrates Gellner’s 
contention that modern industrial society is not mobile 
because it is egalitarian, it is egalitarian because it is 
mobile.
The second significant trend which has been geared 
towards cheaper labour, is the regional restructuring of 
industry which has taken place in the past three decades. 
Significant changes in geographical location occurred in 
industries such as textiles, clothing and footwear, which 
depend for their international competitiveness on cheap, 
relatively unskilled labour. At first these industries shifted
11
particularly to Durban-Pinetown and the Cape Peninsula, 
I believe, because of the availability of Indian and 
Coloured labour there. Compared to the largely white 
workforce in these industries in the Transvaal and Port 
Elizabeth (the largest footwear producer in the fifties and 
sixties), Indian and Coloured labour was relatively cheap 
as well as efficient. In the 1970s, there was a shift in 
these industries to the country’s industrial periphery, that 
is, to centres of cheap black labour in or near the 
Bantustans. Essentially, in my view, what these 
geographical shifts did was facilitate the substitution of 
one racial group for another, and cheaper for more 
expensive labour, in the workforces of those industries in 
which labour costs are crucial.
The geographical shifts were, I believe, primarily a 
spontaneous response by manufacturers to market forces. 
They were a defensive reaction to recession and to fiercer 
international competition, rather than simply a response 
to financial inducements provided by the state, though 
these assisted the process. They contributed to lower 
production costs and thus helped to make the industries 
more competitive.
The third trend relevant to cheaper labour and hence to 
the competitiveness of South African manufacturing, is a 
worldwide tendency, which has emerged in the past 
couple of decades, to make increasing use of a system of 
sub-contracting, or outwork, in certain industries. This 
takes various forms, but the particular phenomenon with 
which I am concerned here involves a factory sub­
12
contracting certain parts of the process of manufacture to 
small-scale producers in the informal or formal sector.
An example is the use of outwork in the footwear 
industry. Traditionally, in a shoe factory, after the leather 
uppers are cut, the operation of sewing together, or 
"closing", the uppers has been performed in the same 
factory. However, it has now become quite common 
abroad, as in the United Kingdom, for instance, for shoe 
factories to sub-contract out much of their closing to 
small scale producers6. This practice has recently begun 
to emerge here. It is as yet in an early and uncertain 
stage of development, and is the subject of research being 
undertaken by Helena Nicholls in my Department.
Outwork has certain advantages for manufacturers, and 
perhaps also for some kinds of workers, particularly in 
the stagnant, intensely competitive, and unstable economic 
conditions in which it has arisen. Its significance in the 
South African footwear industry is that, in as much as 
subcontracting cuts the labour costs of manufacturers, it 
is seen as a crucial part of a strategy to become more 
competitive in world markets.
We turn now to another factor influencing the 
competitiveness of manufacturing industry, an area in 
which we have also made some progress. In addition to 
the real exchange rate and the cost of labour, 
competitiveness is also affected by the type of production 
system used in industry.
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Due to the astonishing success of Japanese industry, 
world-wide attention has been given to the adoption of 
Japanese-style production systems7. Some features of these 
systems are: emphasis on worker flexibility, to permit 
rotation between jobs; a system of "total quality control", 
making the avoidance of quality defects the responsibility 
of all production workers rather than specialist quality 
control inspectors; involvement of all workers in improving 
productivity; and the delivery of materials to the plant 
and the production line at the last possible moment 
before use, or "just-in-time", to reduce inventories and so 
save costs.
The evidence is clear that these systems are transferable 
to places outside Japan. Contrary to some early views, 
they are not dependent on Japanese culture, in that they 
do not depend on factors inherent in the Japanese 
character, the outlook associated with Zen Buddhism, and 
such like. Nor is association with Japanese companies 
necessary for their adoption.
Some progress has been made in applying Japanese 
production principles in South Africa, as for instance, in 
the motor vehicle industry. The extent of this is very 
uneven but the performance of the most productive, or 
"best-practice", South African assembly plant appears quite 
respectable by international standards. Obviously it cannot 
be compared with those plants in the major industrial 
countries which apply these systems, and, in addition, 
have high levels of automation and the advantages of 
large scale. But in relation to some Newly Industrialising
14
countries applying these systems, and even some 
European plants, its performance seems creditable.
In a country such as South Africa there are social and 
economic limits to the application of the Japanese model. 
For instance, high literacy rates, like those of the 
Japanese, may be necessary for versatility and the 
involvement of all workers in quality control and 
productivity improvement, which is the system’s aim. 
However, it seems that whatever the educational level may 
be, application of Japanese production methods can 
significantly improve performance. Overseas evidence 
suggests that production technique may be more
important than education as a determinant of productivity. 
Given our present relatively low educational levels, it 
seems to me this is significant for South Africa.
Nonetheless there are other impediments to the adoption 
of Japanese systems in a country like South Africa. The 
systems have been aptly described as "lean" in that they 
involve low manning levels, due to high productivity and 
low absentee rates; few personnel and small factory space 
devoted to rectification of quality defects; and low 
inventories of materials and finished products. This is 
their strength, but also their weakness, because these 
same features make the Japanese systems "fragile", in that 
they depend on a collaborative relationship between 
management and workers.
The Japanese achieved this collaborative relationship 
partly through devices such as so-called "life-time"
15
employment, and recruiting and promoting supervisors and 
managers from within the company. These practices made 
workers identify strongly with the long-term interests of 
the company, and so willing to assist in achieving higher 
productivity, without fear of losing their jobs. Life-time 
employment, however, probably depends heavily on the 
stability of the Japanese economy. In more unstable 
economic conditions, such as ours, employers are 
unwilling to relinquish the option of retrenching workers 
when markets collapse. Furthermore, where there are 
limits on the upward mobility of production workers 
within companies, as there have been for blacks in South 
Africa, a policy of promotion from within provides little 
incentive for more collaborative industrial relations. 
Labour disputes increase the danger of disrupting local 
supplies, and so are inimical to just-in-time inventory 
management.
The Japanese model in a country like South Africa, thus, 
can probably be pursued only with substantial adaptations 
to local conditions. Further progress in the adoption of 
Japanese or other modern production systems however, is 
essential if we are to compete in the 1990s8.
Let us sum up the situation of manufacturing industry as 
we move towards the New South Africa. In addition to 
the exchange rate, some economic trends have made for 
greater international competitiveness, and have indeed 
been prompted by a desire for it - the erosion of the 
industrial colour bar, decentralisation of industry and, 
recently, sub-contracting, which have made for lower
16
labour costs and hence cheaper, more competitive goods, 
and the adoption of modern production systems.
I come to deal more directly with the future. The state, 
business and unions have a crucial role to play in shaping 
the future of South African industry.
First, let us consider the state’s trade and industrial 
policies. We need a policy to promote exports. This fact 
has not been lost on the government. They seem to 
favour two strategies, both misguided in my view.
The first is the so-called General Export Incentive 
Scheme, implemented in April this year9. With certain 
exceptions, all exports qualify for a subsidy in terms of 
the scheme. A basic problem is that the scheme is too 
unselective. The available financial resources are spread 
too thinly over too many exporting firms and industries at 
once. Many firms and industries who receive the subsidy 
would have exported anyway. Free gifts to such firms are 
wasteful of taxpayers’ money. Not only is the scheme 
wasteful, we cannot afford it. The sum set aside has 
predictably turned out to be inadequate for the cash 
grants originally envisaged.
The second misguided strategy for increasing exports is to 
liberalize imports by cutting tariffs and removing other 
barriers to imports. The idea behind this is that freer 
access to imported goods used by domestic manufacturers 
in production, will reduce production costs and so make 
them more competitive in foreign markets. Also, there is
17
a belief that if producers of goods currently protected are 
exposed to foreign competition, they will, via some kind 
of challenge-response mechanism become more efficient 
and competitive.
The trouble with this is that exposure to foreign 
competition can just as easily kill off certain industries as 
spur them to greater heights of efficiency and 
competitiveness. There are in fact neither theoretical nor 
empirical grounds for believing in the challenge response 
mechanism10 If the level of productivity is not high 
enough to start with, greater exposure to foreign 
competition will destroy productive capacity and jobs. 
Also, there is no guarantee that cutting tariffs will cause 
other industries to expand enough to absorb the labour 
made redundant in industries adversely affected by foreign 
competition. The traditional case for free trade depends 
on the assumption of full-employment, high mobility of 
labour between industries, and very quick adjustments. 
When these conditions do not hold - as they certainly 
do not in South Africa today - it breaks down11. We 
must therefore preserve as much of existing manufacturing 
employment as we can, while building up new production 
and employment capacity. Import liberalisation must be 
pursued with extreme caution and very selectively. We 
should ignore the widespread appeals for "across-the- 
board", indiscriminate tariff cuts.
What options are left for new policy-makers who will 
need to promote exports? In my view, an important 
option is sectoral targeting; that is, only a few branches
18
or sectors of industry should be selected for special 
promotion at any one time. The developmental effort and 
available resources should be concentrated on these. 
Sectors should be selected on the basis of their potential 
competitive advantage, and the technological and other 
benefits they are likely to confer on other industries. To 
do this requires detailed studies of major individual 
sectors, and the formulation of measures tailored to the 
particular circumstances of each sector.
Furthermore, in promoting an individual branch or sector 
of industry, encouragement of production for the domestic 
market by means of import duties, and encouragement of 
exports, should not be seen as separate or conflicting 
strategies. In fact, they go hand in hand. An import duty 
does not simply raise the price of imports, as some think. 
It also encourages domestic firms to produce more of the 
protected item, thereby expanding the size of firms, and 
reducing production costs; it gives them larger profits 
which they can use to invest in the development of 
products for export markets, or to establish sales and 
service networks abroad, or simply to charge lower prices 
for their exports. Import duties can thus facilitate 
exporting. In turn, export expansion can increase an 
industry’s ability to compete in the home market12.
Import substitution and export promotion thus are not 
mutually exclusive, but complementary. Indeed, the decline 
of the real exchange rate has increased the 
competitiveness of domestic producers in both home and
19
export markets, and production for both should be 
encouraged13.
As experience elsewhere shows, used judiciously, sectoral 
targeting can have a powerful impact. In the single recent 
instance where the government has undertaken a detailed 
study of a major manufacturing sector, and implemented 
policy accordingly, the results have been very encouraging. 
I refer to the so-called Phase VI programme for the 
motor vehicle industry. It has various weaknesses in detail, 
and does not represent my ideal of sectoral targeting. 
Nevertheless the basic principles are sound, and, despite 
its defects, it is bringing considerable benefits14.
The government has nevertheless seen fit to call a halt to 
sectoral programmes of this or any other kind. They say 
such programmes require civil service manpower, and are 
too expensive. The government department concerned has 
declared its intention to "cut down on spending and 
bureaucratization"15 - false economy indeed.
Selectivity is crucial. Indeed, industrial policy in some 
countries has gone further, and has focused on individual 
firms with very successful results16. For instance, the 
Japanese government’s encouragement of one company 
(Fujitsu FANUC) was largely responsible for the fact that 
Japan in the 1980s came to dominate the world’s machine 
tools industry17. There seems to me an overwhelmingly 
strong case for tailoring policies to individual industries.
What difference could a fully democratic South Africa
20
make in this area? The present doctrinaire application of 
free market principles will almost certainly go. In its 
absence, considerable opportunity exists for future 
improvement in industrial policy, provided the new 
government adopts a pragmatic approach18.
The future role of the state, however, does not rest solely 
in the formulation of trade and industrial policy. The 
state affects our international political relations, and hence 
our international economic relations - particularly access 
to foreign markets and to foreign capital. This too has a 
bearing on our growth prospects.
First, foreign markets. The urgent need for export 
expansion has made the lifting of sanctions an increasingly 
important matter.
Some recent writing argues that trade sanctions, by 
forcing us into import substitution, had a major adverse 
impact on our industrial performance even before the 
mid-1980s19. I find this unconvincing. In my view, trade 
sanctions, particularly boycotts of our exports, have 
become a significant constraint only since the mid-1980s. 
Only since then has it become possible to contemplate 
seriously a shift toward export-oriented industrialisation.
The need, however, is not simply to remove the present 
boycotts of South African goods imposed by the United 
States and the European Community at the end of 1986. 
This would probably have a relatively small positive effect 
on our ability to pursue export-oriented industrialisation20.
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Rather, the lifting of these boycotts is a necessary first 
step towards achieving completely free access to the 
world’s major markets, and possibly even preferential 
treatment. It is noteworthy that many of the successful 
exporting countries (such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan 
and more recently the People’s Republic of China) were 
able, mainly for political reasons, to gain especially 
favourable access to the US market. Political factors, as 
well as South Africa’s pivotal role in the economic 
development of the whole southern African region, may 
enable us to do the same - as progress is made towards 
the New South Africa.
International political relations will also have some bearing 
on our ability to obtain foreign capital, which may be 
necessary to enable firms to expand and export. Foreign 
capital enters a country chiefly by means of either direct 
investment, by multinational corporations, or loans from 
foreign banks.
Let us take direct investment first. In the mid-1980s there 
was wholesale disinvestment by US multinationals, as a 
result of the political campaign abroad. With a change in 
our international political relations, will there be a 
resurgence of investment in manufacturing industry?
The willingness of foreigners to invest in future, in my 
view, will depend mainly on their assessment of the 
competitiveness and likely profitability of South African 
manufacturing. It is true that many of the multinationals 
which withdrew from South Africa in the mid-1980s did
22
so for political rather than economic reasons. But we 
cannot infer from this that they would want to return 
here or that others would want to invest in the New 
South Africa for the first time. The volume of foreign 
direct investment will depend more on an improvement 
in economic fundamentals than on any improvement in 
international political relations.
How badly do we need foreign direct investment anyway? 
Some estimates of our need for foreign capital to achieve 
high rates of growth are in my view gross exaggerations. 
In developing countries foreign direct investment has 
generally been a consequence, rather than a cause, of 
rapid industrialisation. Rapidly growing economies have in 
fact depended relatively little on foreign capital, compared 
to domestic savings21. Fundamentally competitive 
economies are able to generate enough savings of their 
own, and to convert them into foreign exchange by 
exporting. The irony is this; if we get the fundamentals 
right we shall need foreign capital relatively little22, but it 
will come; if we don’t, we shall need it desperately, but 
we won’t get it.
International political relations will have a bigger part to 
play in the area of foreign loans, however. In September 
1985, like numerous other developing countries before us, 
we had a foreign debt crisis. Foreign bankers refused to 
renew their loans to us, and terms of repayment had to 
be negotiated. The reasons for this, as in other 
developing countries, were fundamentally economic, and 
not due to sanctions. But political factors have made the
23
resumption of foreign lending more difficult. Continued 
improvement in our international political relations, should 
further improve our access to foreign loans and facilitate 
the restructuring of manufacturing industry23.
Apart from industrial and trade policy, and international 
political relations, there is a third area in which the state 
in a New South Africa could benefit manufacturing 
industry - black advancement.
If manufacturing industry is to grow much faster in 
future, the process of black upward mobility, touched on 
earlier, will have to be accelerated and carried much 
further up the occupational ladder. This is particularly 
so since we cannot depend as heavily on immigration as 
we have done traditionally.
In a political system in which blacks have considerably 
more power, the process of black advancement will 
accelerate for two reasons.
First, and perhaps most important in the short-term, there 
will be a marked changed in attitudes towards blacks as 
potential supervisors and managers24.
Second, there is likely to be a substantial increase in 
expenditure on black education. The connection between 
educational expenditure and the output of skills required 
by the economy is a complex one, and excessive 
expenditure can have a negative effect on economic
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development25. Nevertheless, this should accelerate black 
advancement26.
It perhaps goes without saying, that we need to preserve 
the present stock of skills. As Heribert Adam27 points 
out, we cannot afford the mistakes made elsewhere of not 
retaining people whose skills are an important part of the 
wealth of South Africa.
I come now to the topical issue of future state policy 
relating to monopolies and to conglomerates, such as 
Anglo American. I confine myself to a few aspects of 
this, relevant to the competitiveness of manufacturing. 
However objectionable the concentration of economic 
power in conglomerates may seem on political grounds, 
in an economy such as ours conglomerates do have some 
positive benefits.
They have the advantage in a developing country, like 
South Africa, of conserving scarce entrepreneurial talent. 
In a conglomerate, able individuals are utilised to their 
full potential in large and varied activities.
Conglomerates are diversified, with investments in a wide 
range of companies. Diversification reduces risk, and so 
facilitates investment - an important consideration in an 
economy as unstable as ours.
Some concern has been expressed that the conglomerates, 
because of their economic power, will be able to frustrate 
future government attempts to plan particular sectors.
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However, in some ways conglomerates may facilitate 
rather than hinder such planning. Sectoral planning is 
more difficult if government has to deal with a large 
number of individual, completely independent firms. 
Indeed, in Korea government has made constructive use 
of conglomerates, with interests in a number of sectors, 
to plan and implement sectoral programmes28.
In connection with sectoral planning, too, it should be 
noted that though a conglomerate may control many 
companies, this does not necessarily mean that it has 
monopoly power in any individual industry. To take just 
one example, both Anglo American and Sanlam are 
represented in the motor vehicle industry, but they are in 
cutthroat competition with each other and with five other 
companies, including the market leader, Toyota. Thus, in 
recent South African experience, sectoral planning 
exercises in this industry are by no means dominated by 
the conglomerates29.
We do not know at this stage whether in the New South 
Africa an attempt will be made to reduce the degree of 
economic concentration; nor what the effects would be of 
any such attempt. I believe, however, that the few points 
I have raised indicate that, at least from the point of 
view of industrialisation, much careful analysis is needed 
before decisions are taken.
However, the future of South African manufacturing 
industry depends not only on the state but on relations
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between business and trade unions. Industrial relations 
will play a crucial role.
Trade unions have a bearing on several of the specific 
trends described earlier: the location of factories in 
relatively non-unionized, low-wage areas; sub-contracting; 
and the adoption of modern production systems. At a 
larger level, the trade union movement will certainly 
influence the political and economic environment of 
business, with implications for our industrial future. I 
cannot even begin to consider these larger matters.
Let me single out just one question, the wage issue, 
which is clearly of fundamental importance to the future 
growth of manufacturing output and employment, and 
seems to me to illustrate the essence of our problems. 
Due to economic stagnation, real wage rates in 
manufacturing industry have in the past decade risen 
relatively slowly. Partly for this reason, wage rates in this 
country are not as high as we would like them to be, and 
trade unions are obviously concerned to raise them. From 
the manufacturers point of view, the problem is that our 
wage rates, though low, are not low enough compared to 
several other countries with whom we are directly or 
indirectly in competition. It is this that counts when we 
envisage the rapid, broadly-based expansion of 
manufactured exports, and of employment, which now 
seems to be essential.
Thus, contrary to recent opinion, it is by no means clear 
that we have a competitive advantage in industries like
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textiles, clothing and footwear, that rely heavily on cheap 
labour30. Even allowing for the lifting of sanctions, 
therefore, it seems very unlikely that a major part of the 
needed export expansion will come from these industries.
Even in some less labour-intensive industries, such as 
motor vehicle assembly, wages are by no means irrelevant. 
In this industry our wage rates are higher than in several 
Newly Industrialising Countries with similar or better 
levels of productivity, so that we do not have a labour 
cost advantage in this area either. It is thus, difficult at 
present to compete in export markets, except in more 
capital-intensive manufacturing activities - a major 
disadvantage for the rapid employment growth which we 
need31.
As this suggests, the need to increase competitiveness in 
order to join the global rat-race for exports is doubtless 
adding to the social and political stresses over the wage 
issue. Some now take it for granted that the New South 
Africa will bring a substantial improvement in 
capital/labour relations, but this particular source of 
industrial conflict will not go away. The present need for 
us to make the transition from import-substituting to 
export-oriented industrialisation is thus a fundamental 
obstacle to temperate industrial relations.
There is, however, an older and more fundamental 
obstacle to temperate industrial relations in this country. 
We have a distribution of income which is widely
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regarded as inequitable. Trade unions are obviously 
concerned to redress the balance.
How is this obstacle to be overcome? This brings me to 
the crucial question of the relationship between income 
distribution and economic growth. Clearly what we should 
like to have is a combination of faster economic growth 
and an improved distribution of income. Can we get it?
Some emphasize that growth depends on an improvement 
in the distribution of income. There is something to be 
said for this. Up to a point, in the New South Africa, 
increased government expenditure in such areas as black 
education, housing and health, could contribute to an 
improvement in the racial distribution of income and, at 
the same time, serve to promote growth. There are 
clearly limits, however, to the extent to which such 
increases in expenditure on their own are conducive to 
faster growth, particularly in the short-term.
Furthermore, increased government expenditure in these 
areas leaves largely untouched the enormous inequalities 
in the distribution of wealth - that is, in the ownership of 
income-earning assets - which are a major cause of 
black/white income inequality. Hence one of the appeals 
of nationalisation -if blacks as individuals cannot quickly 
acquire a significantly larger share of South Africa’s 
wealth then the state must do so on their behalf. But 
whatever else may be said for this, it is unlikely to do 
much for economic growth.
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What of the converse, that an improvement in the 
distribution of income depends on economic growth? 
There is truth in this too, but it needs to be carefully 
stated. Rapid economic growth can bring about an 
improvement in the racial distribution of income, but it 
is not sufficient on its own: in the period 1950 to 1970 
there was no improvement in the racial distribution of 
income despite relatively rapid economic growth. Nor 
does slow economic growth preclude an improvement in 
the racial distribution of income: we have had slow 
growth since the early 1970s, yet the proportion of 
national income going to blacks has been increasing. We 
have never had the combination of rapid economic growth 
and improvement in the distribution of income.
This combination, however, has in fact been achieved in 
some successful East Asian countries. It has hinged on 
sustained rapid growth of manufacturing output and 
employment, achieved largely through export expansion, 
exactly the kind of strategy which, whether we like it or 
not, now seems unavoidable if we are to grow rapidly. 
Rapid industrialisation permits the reallocation of workers 
from low productivity sectors of the economy (such as 
agriculture and large parts of the informal sector) to 
higher productivity jobs in manufacturing; and from low 
to high productivity manufacturing industries. Clearly, this 
automatically raises the average productivity of workers in 
the economy as a whole, and hence income per head. 
The more rapidly manufacturing grows, the faster this 
process of labour reallocation, and the faster the increase 
in income per capita. This seems to have been the
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principal reason for the spectacular growth of income per 
capita, and improved income distribution, in Korea32.
To improve income distribution significantly, however, 
rapid reallocation of labour must be sustained over a long 
period. Though import substitution must play an 
important part, sustained rapid growth of manufacturing 
can only be achieved through export expansion. There are 
limits to rapid industrialisation based mainly on the 
domestic market. This was why we could not sustain our 
rapid industrial growth beyond the end of the 1960s.
In my view, then, in our present circumstances, sustained, 
rapid, export-oriented industrialisation is the only route to 
both accelerated economic growth and a significant 
improvement in the distribution of income. I do not 
believe there is any other way in which these two things 
can be got together33. This obviously does not preclude 
measures aimed more directly and primarily at 
redistributing income, and such measures must be 
adopted, but there is clearly a limit to the extent to 
which they will, on their own, be conducive to faster 
economic growth.
This brings us full circle: successful export-oriented 
industrialisation requires a competitive manufacturing 
sector, which depends inter aha on industrial relations. If 
income inequalities are an insuperable obstacle to good 
industrial relations, we are in a bind : for then we cannot 
get growth without a more equal distribution of income;
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nor get a significantly better income distribution without 
growth.
But the achievement of decent and temperate industrial 
relation does not depend only on unions. It depends also 
on business and government, and their avoidance of 
confrontational attitudes, such as those reflected in the 
1988 amendments to the Labour Relations Act. The fact 
that these amendments are now to be reversed, provides 
some hope that improved industrial relations can be 
achieved by political means, while the longer term goal of 
reducing income inequalities is being pursued. This must 
include gaining union input into and support for industrial 
policies.
Let me conclude. The future of manufacturing does not 
only depend on domestic conditions. Factors outside of 
our control, such as higher oil prices due to the crisis in 
the Persian Gulf, will impact on the entire world 
economy, and we shall not escape their effects. But, as 
noted at the outset, the effects of global forces on 
individual countries have in the past varied greatly, 
depending largely on domestic social and economic 
conditions.
Much therefore depends on ourselves34. We need to 
foster and accelerate existing positive trends. Sane and 
sensible positions are called for on the part of 
government, present and future, business and unions on 
matters affecting the future of manufacturing industry - 
including industrial and trade policies, educational and
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other government expenditure, economic concentration, 
and capital/labour relations. The process of transition to 
a New South Africa will probably contribute directly to 
more rapid industrialisation mainly in so far as it 
improves our international political relations, as it is 
already doing. However, the economically and politically 
difficult task of creating an internationally competitive, 
export-oriented manufacturing sector, capable of sustained, 
rapid growth, will remain.
For a deeply divided society, without anything like the 
sense of common purpose and social solidarity which has 
been a major factor in the success of Japan, this is a tall 
order35. It will require a great deal of Gellner’s 
"irreversible commitment to industrial society", as great if 
not greater than the government’s declared commitment 
to "irreversible political change". It remains to be seen if 
we have what it takes.
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Notes
1. Gellner (1983:39). Thanks are due to Graham Neame 
of the Department of History, University of the 
Witwatersrand, for introducing me to Gellner’s work.
2.See, for instance, Sunday Times, September 30, 1990.
3.See Lewis (1989). In earlier decades, with a flourishing 
minerals-exporting sector, we were in a position to afford 
the costs of import-substituting industrialisation.
4. Bell 1975. See also Du Plessis 1973, Bell 1989, 1990.
5. Hindson and Crankshaw (1990).
6. Rubery and Wilkinson (1981).
7. There is a problem in diagnosing the sources of the 
Japanese achievement. (Vernon 1990). It is difficult to 
know to what extent it nas depended on Japan’s overall 
industrial and financial structure, on the nature of 
relations between Japanese manufacturers and their 
suppliers, and the organisation of production. To limit 
discussion we focus on the last of these, Japanese 
production systems.
8. Because of their partial independence of education, it 
may well be true, as a recent World Bank (1989) report 
states, that they "offer the most cost effective and rapid 
way for Sub-Saharan Africa to improve its competitiveness 
quickly".
9.I am grateful to my colleague Greg Farrell for providing 
me with information on this scheme.
l 0.Martin (1978).
11. See, for instance, Robinson (1966) and Blinder (1988).
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12. Tariffs raise prices in the domestic market and so tend 
to reduce the incentive to export. However, this can be 
neutralised by simultaneous export subsidies of various 
kinds, or, in some cases, simply by compelling producers 
to export in return for protection in the domestic market 
- that is by imposing what are called export performance 
requirements (Rodrik 1987).
13. There is evidence for several countries, including 
Korea, that rapid import substitution and rapid export 
expansion go together in the same industry. (Westphal 
1981; Nishimuzu and Robinson 1984: 198; Pack and 
Westphal 1986).
14. The problems of this industry he elsewhere, e.g. in the 
excessive number of assemblers relative to market size, 
and very unfavourable macroeconomic conditions.
15. Financial Mail, April 27, 1990, p.28.
16. As one writer puts it, "it is not industrial policies but 
companies that compete internationally within an industry".
(Collis 1987:8).
17. Collis (1987: 25-26). I do not suggest that we should 
necessarily intervene at this level, though I would not rule 
it out.
18. However, the Korean and Japanese cases show that 
success depends on political conditions, particularly a 
close working relationship between government and 
business. (Rhee, Ross-Larson and Pursell, 1984, ch. 3).
19. Becker and Pollard (1990).
20. The only manufactured goods directly affected by them 
are iron and steel, clothing and textiles.
21. Riedel (1987).
22. This clearly does not mean that we will not need 
foreign technology, but this can often be obtained 
separately, through licensing arrangements.
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23. The New South Africa might also see an increase in 
the bargaining strength of the state vis-a-vis foreign 
governments and foreign business. Beleaguered 
governments, such as ours have been for some years, 
tread very warily, for fear of alienating their few foreign 
friends. In short, their bargaining position is weakened. 
This can reduce their autonomy m various areas vital to 
the national economic interest, such as industrial policy 
and the terms on which foreign companies participate in 
the economy.
24.See Gellner 1987:93-95 for an interesting sidelight on 
the sociology of this process.
25.I am indebted to my colleague Andrew Donaldson for 
discussion of these points.
26. The question of the kind of education needed I leave 
to the educationalists. Suffice it to say that I incline to 
Gellner’s insistence on generic, or general, education 
rather than specialized vocational training. Given the need 
for innovation and hence mobility in industrial society, 
general education engenders flexibility and versatility. 
Training specific to most jobs is relatively easily acquired 
later, often on-the-job. Education should also be 
standardized to facilitate "communication between 
strangers" in the workplace.
27. Adam (1987:116).
28. These conglomerates, because of their extensive 
international networks, have been particularly useful in 
implementing export targets. The Korean case suggests 
that, in some circumstances at least, conglomerates may 
be a national economic asset rather than a liability.
29. Nor is monopoly necessarily a bad thing for 
industrialisation. The smaller a country’s home market, the 
fewer the number of producers of efficient size it can 
support. Even economically large countries including the 
U.S. are now seeing the need to relax their anti-
monopolies legislation to enable industry to cope more 
effectively with foreign competition. (Vernon 1990:100).
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30. For instance, our wage rates in the clothing industry 
are considerably higher than in several East Asian 
countries, particularly Communist China, one of the most 
successful exporters to the US in the 1980s. (Mody and 
Wheeler 1987). This and the present state of our textiles 
industry (Business Day September 28, p. 10) underline the 
difficulties in such industries.
31. At present the bulk of our manufactured exports are 
from capital-intensive, natural resource based industries, 
such as food products, iron and steel, and basic 
chemicals. Export expansion will probably depend to a 
significant extent on diversification into new products of 
this kind, and on processing further "downstream" of such 
products.
32.See Chenery (1983) and Pack (1988). Korea’s high 
growth rates have evidently not been due primarily, as 
many suppose, to exceptionally rapid rates of growth of 
productivity in individual branches of manufacturing 
industry.
33.In particular, I do not believe that "inward- 
industrialisation", now being espoused, in different 
versions, by both the economic right and left, can achieve 
this.
34. Some would have us believe that high interest rates, 
and a lowering of government expenditure, inflation rates, 
and corporate tax rates are the key to future success. 
This is not so and I have therefore not discussed such 
matters. High interest rates are a symptom of our 
problems, not a cure for them: they will neither raise 
domestic savings nor facilitate the investment necessary 
for the creation of a competitive manufacturing sector. 
Government expenditure cuts, likewise, are a sign of our 
poverty, not a remedy for it. Low inflation is not 
fundamental to rapid growth: low inflation countries have 
not grown faster than nigh inflation countries. (e.g. Bruno 
and Sachs 1985: 5).The case for lower corporate tax rates 
is more complex, and needs consideration at greater 
length: it is clear however that other factors must be 
favourable to profitability for a firm to benefit from lower 
tax rates.
35.Dore (1986:7).
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